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In Brief
The rat hippocampus spontaneously
imagines past and future locations in
rapid sequences (sometimes called
‘‘replay’’), which link multiple locations
into coherent neural representations.
Kurth-Nelson et al. find similar sequences
in humans, in a non-spatial task,
suggesting they are a ubiquitous
mechanism.
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Fast internally generated sequences of neural repre-
sentations are suggested to support learning and
online planning. However, these sequences have
only been studied in the context of spatial tasks
and never in humans. Here, we recordedmagnetoen-
cephalography (MEG) while human subjects per-
formed a novel non-spatial reasoning task. The task
required selecting paths through a set of six visual
objects. We trained pattern classifiers on the MEG
activity elicited by direct presentation of the visual
objects alone and tested these classifiers on activity
recorded during periods when no object was pre-
sented. During these object-free periods, the brain
spontaneously visited representations of approxi-
mately four objects in fast sequences lasting on the
order of 120 ms. These sequences followed back-
ward trajectories along the permissible paths in the
task. Thus, spontaneous fast sequential representa-
tion of states can be measured non-invasively in hu-
mans, and these sequences may be a fundamental
feature of neural computation across tasks.
INTRODUCTION
Most areas of the brain are engaged in encoding and represent-
ing current sensory inputs, contexts, and motor outputs. How-
ever, neural activity can also be decoupled from current input
to encode representations of past or possible future states.
Such decoupling is argued to underpin memory, imagination,
and planning (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Buzsa´ki and Moser,
2013; Carr et al., 2011; Jadhav et al., 2012; van der Meer et al.,
2012; Pezzulo et al., 2014; Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013;Wikenheiser
and Redish, 2015).
A remarkable, but now well-established, finding is that the de-
coupled activity of populations of neurons sometimes takes the
form of internally generated sequences that encode trajectories
through past or possible future states. This phenomenon has
been most studied in rodent hippocampus, where place cells
that normally encode an organism’s current position in space
also spontaneously play out sequences of other positions194 Neuron 91, 194–204, July 6, 2016 ª 2016 The Authors. Published
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creative(Diba and Buzsa´ki, 2007; Foster and Wilson, 2006; Louie and
Wilson, 2001; Skaggs and McNaughton, 1996). Internally gener-
ated hippocampal sequences occur in two distinct physiological
contexts, embedded within sharp-wave ripple events (e.g., Diba
and Buzsa´ki, 2007) or nested within theta rhythm (e.g., Johnson
and Redish, 2007). The relationship between sequences in these
two contexts remains unknown (Schmidt and Redish, 2013), and
here we discuss observations in both. Spontaneous hippocam-
pal sequences have been observed in sleep and wakefulness
and appear in a variety of spatial tasks (Davidson et al., 2009;
Gupta et al., 2010; Karlsson and Frank, 2009; Lee and Wilson,
2002). Although less extensive, there is also evidence for fast
spontaneous sequences outside of hippocampus (Euston
et al., 2007; Hoffman and McNaughton, 2002). The interaction
of cortical with hippocampal sequences is not yet understood,
although in simultaneous recordings the hippocampus plays
out what appears to be the same experience as visual cortex
(Ji and Wilson, 2007).
Two, notmutually exclusive, classes of function are suggested
for fast spontaneous sequences. First, in the context of learning,
they may be part of a mechanism for consolidating or maintain-
ing knowledge, particularly in cortex (Ka´li and Dayan, 2004;
Louie and Wilson, 2001; Mnih et al., 2015; Siapas and Wilson,
1998). Temporal compression of sequences, relative to real
experience, might bring distal events within a time frame within
which synaptic plasticity mechanisms can operate, particularly
those used for credit assignment (Foster and Wilson, 2006; Jen-
sen and Lisman, 2005; Skaggs et al., 1996). Second, sequences
may play a role in planning or look-ahead in decision making,
either online or offline (Sutton, 1991). Sequences beginning at
the animal’s current location sometimes predict the path the an-
imal will run in the immediate future (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013;
Wikenheiser and Redish, 2015). Concurrently, value signals
emerge that are suggested to be a downstream consequence
of such prospection (Lansink et al., 2009; van der Meer and Re-
dish, 2009; van der Meer et al., 2010).
Despite the importance of fast spontaneous sequences, and
their potential generality as a mechanism for learning and deci-
sion making (Buzsa´ki and Moser, 2013), they have so far only
been studied in spatial tasks, and overwhelmingly in rodents.
Our goal was to investigate spontaneous neural sequences in
a non-spatial context in healthy human volunteers. Previously,
we used multivariate analysis of magnetoencephalography
(MEG) data to decode time-resolved representations of visual
objects that were not currently being experienced (Kurth-Nelsonby Elsevier Inc.
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Figure 1. Task Design
Participants navigated between six states (S1–S6), each corresponding to a visual object.
(A) The states were linked to one another as shown, although the visual objects assigned to each state number were randomized across participants.
(B) On each trial, participants began in a random state and were permitted four moves. They had up to 60 s to plan these four moves. The four moves were then
entered rapidly with no feedback. After rapidly entering their chosen sequence of moves, participants were required to play out this sequence. While playing out
the sequence, the objects and their associated reward were visible.
(C) The reward associated with each state drifted slowly over trials. The total reward earned in each trial was cumulative of the reward collected along the path.
When a ‘‘neg’’ state was reached, it caused the sign of the cumulative collected reward to flip (negative to positive and vice versa).
(D) Distributions over participants of time used to plan, up to a maximum permitted 60 s. Each color corresponds to a unique participant, sorted by mean
planning time.
(E) Distributions over participants of money earned per trial, relative to the expected earnings of a random policy on that trial. Each color corresponds to the same
participant as in (D).
(F) Trials with greater earnings tended to have shorter planning time (p = 0.002 by linear mixed model). However, participants with shorter mean planning time did
not have higher mean earnings. Each point is a trial, with all participants shown together.et al., 2015). We therefore reasoned that it might be possible to
detect spontaneous fast sequences using MEG in a non-spatial
task in which states were defined by decodeable visual objects.
RESULTS
Task
Participants performed a novel six-state non-spatial navigation
task. Each state was defined by a unique visual object and asso-
ciated with a varying amount of reward, ranging from 5 to +5
pence. From each state, two choices were available (called
‘‘up’’ and ‘‘down’’), each of which led to a different state (Fig-
ures 1A and 1B). Before scanning, participants were trained to
criterion on the structure of the task. On each trial during scan-
ning, participants started from a random state and were asked
to enter a sequence of four moves with the goal of collecting
as much reward as possible. This sequence of moves defined
a path around the maze. To discourage simple stimulus-
response learning strategies, the task had two additional fea-
tures. First, reward amounts changed by 1p, 0p, or 1p at
random per trial (Figure 1C). Second, at the beginning of each
trial, participants were informed that two (randomly selected)states would be ‘‘neg,’’ meaning that reaching either of these
states would multiply the trial’s cumulative reward by1. Impor-
tantly, participants never saw a bird’s-eye view of the maze and
only experienced one visual object at a time. At debriefing, no
participant reported conceiving the relationships between ob-
jects in a spatial manner.
We reasoned that neural sequences following the transition
structureof the taskcouldonly occur if participants in fact learned
the transition structure. Although the training and task were de-
signed to encourage such learning, we sought to confirm that it
did actually occur. First, in 2–3 days of training before scanning,
all participants were required to reach a criterion of 100% accu-
racyona set of automatedquiz questions that probedknowledge
of the transition structure (e.g., ‘‘if you start at horn and go up,
wherewill yoube?’’). Second, in debriefingpost scanning, all par-
ticipants reported a subjective experience of deploying knowl-
edge of transitions for planning. For example, ‘‘I didn’t always
manage to think four steps ahead, but sometimes I did’’ and
‘‘I tried tomakea four-stepplan, but sometimesmissed the nega-
tive on the fourth step.’’ Third, model comparison on behavioral
choice data strongly favored models that planned with the task’s
structure over stimulus-response models (Figure S1).Neuron 91, 194–204, July 6, 2016 195
After the starting state was revealed at the beginning of a trial,
participants were allowed up to 60 s for planning, with the pos-
sibility of entering moves earlier by pressing a button. The distri-
bution of actual planning times is shown in Figure 1D, with a
median of 38.9 s (interquartile range [IQR] = 27.3 s). For
more details of the timings within each trial, see Experimental
Procedures.
After the planning period, participants had to pre-enter their
four moves quickly or face a monetary penalty. During this pre-
entry, the sole feedback was the appearance of an ‘‘up’’ or
‘‘down’’ arrow, displaying each move that they selected. The
mean reaction time to pre-enter the first move in the slowest
participant was 760 ± 50 ms and in the fastest participant was
304 ± 21 ms. After pre-entry, participants were required to
execute the same sequence of moves they had just pre-entered.
During execution, the visual objects associated with each state
were displayed, and as they executed each move, the visual ob-
ject representing the current state faded into the object repre-
senting the next state. The mean reaction time to execute the
first move in the slowest participant was 998 ± 63 ms and in
the fastest participant was 408 ± 18 ms. As each visual object
appeared during execution, its current reward value (from 5
to +5 pence) appeared alongside it. The cumulative total trial
earnings were displayed continuously during the execution
phase and were updated as each visual object appeared.
Task performance, in terms ofmoney earned, was significantly
higher than chance for 9/12 participants (Figure 1E). Between tri-
als, there was a significant relationship between planning time
and earnings, with more money earned on trials with shorter
planning time (Figure 1F; p = 0.002 by mixed effects linear
regression).
Multivariate Models of State Representations
For each subject and for each visual object independently, we
trained a lasso-regularized logistic regression model to recog-
nize instantaneous spatial patterns of MEG elicited by direct vi-
sual presentations of the object. The lasso penalty encouraged
sparsity and tended to select occipital and posterior temporal
sensors as useful features (Figure S2). Data used to train the
regression models were taken from a secondary task in which
the objects were presented multiple times in random order
(see Experimental Procedures for details). Based on findings
from our previous work (Kurth-Nelson et al., 2015), all models
were trained only on MEG data recorded 200 ms after visual ob-
ject onset.
Models were cross-validated on training data to confirm that
they captured essential object-related features in the MEG
signal. When models trained to recognize object k were tested
on left-out data whose true class was k, the predicted probability
reached 0.19 ± 0.02, peaking at 200 ms post stimulus onset.
When models trained to recognize object k were tested on
left-out data whose true class was not k, the predicted proba-
bility reached 0.08 ± 0.003 (Figure 2A). To ascertain that the
models correctly decoded the objects, we also performed the
same analysis 100 times with randomly shuffled state labels.
In each shuffle, we used as a maximal statistic the maximum
predicted probability over states and over time, thereby conser-
vatively controlling for multiple comparisons. This yielded a set196 Neuron 91, 194–204, July 6, 2016of 100 maximal statistics, and we used the 95th percentile of
that set as a p = 0.05 significance threshold (dashed line in Fig-
ure 2A). All models’ actual predicted probabilities exceeded this
threshold when the true stimulus was the same as what they had
been trained to detect.
To test the specificity of the models, we analyzed prediction
accuracies. The set of models together could be treated asmak-
ing a categorical prediction about the class of the left-out data,
by identifying the model with highest output probability on left-
out data. The cross-validated prediction accuracy reached up
to 53.7% ± 3.8%, where chance was 16.7% (Figure 2B). We
also performed a similar shuffling procedure as above, using
the maximum accuracy over time as the maximal statistic, and
found that the true classification accuracy exceeded 100/100
shuffles.
Sequences in Decoded Object Representations
We applied the trained regression models toMEG data collected
in the planning phase of each trial. As already described, this
planning phase was a period that varied in duration from 2 to
60 s (cf. Figure 1D for distribution of times) during which no visual
object was onscreen. Each 10 ms time bin of these data was
independently input to each of the six regression models,
yielding six time series of probabilities for each trial (example
trial shown in Figure 3A). The probability in time bin t from model
k quantified the degree to which the spatial pattern of MEG
activity at time t resembled the evoked neural response to visual
object k.
We next asked whether these time series contained se-
quences that followed possible paths in the behavioral task
based upon a measure we refer to as ‘‘sequenceness.’’ For
example, in the task there was a potential transition from state
S1 to state S2. Sequenceness quantified whether a decoded
neural representation of state S1 was likely to be followed by a
decoded representation of state S2 or, in case of reverse se-
quences, whether S2 would be followed by S1. We operational-
ized sequenceness using a cross-correlation measure (see
Experimental Procedures for details).
Sequenceness could either be forward (e.g., a representation
of state S2 followed that of state S1) or reverse (e.g., S2 preceded
S1).We observed a peak in reverse sequenceness at 40ms of lag
(Figure 3B). This signifies that if a neural representation of state k
was active at time t, then a representation of one or both of the
states with transitions to k was active around time t + 40 ms.
We tested whether sequenceness at 40 ms lag was significantly
different than zero using a multilevel model with a single fixed
intercept term and one random intercept term for each partici-
pant. The fixed intercept term was estimated at 8.3 3 103
(p = 0.0015, two tailed). Next, in order to avoid relying on the as-
sumptions of this model, we used a nonparametric method,
shuffling the state identities 28 times to generate a null distribu-
tion of sequenceness (see Experimental Procedures for details).
By taking the peak of the absolute value of each shuffle across all
possible lags, and then taking the maximum of these peaks
across shuffles, we obtained a conservative two-tailed signifi-
cance threshold at approximately p = 1/28 z 0.036. The real
data exceeded this threshold from 20 to 70 ms of lag. We note
that although the relatively small sample size in our study
AB
Figure 2. Lasso Logistic Regression Models Trained on Direct Pre-
sentations of Visual Objects
For each participant, a separate regression model was trained to recognize
each visual object.
(A) We used leave-one-out cross-validation to test the generalizability of the
learned models. These plots show the average probabilities output by the sixwarrants caution, the consistency of sequenceness between
participants (Figure 3C) was both striking and reassuring.
The logistic regression models had a free parameter defining
the amount of regularization. To ensure the results were not an
artifact of selecting a particular parameter value, the data shown
in Figure 3B, and used for both parametric and non-parametric
statistics described above, were obtained by cross-validating
over this parameter. The parameter used to calculate sequence-
ness for each subject was the value that gave the strongest
average sequenceness in the other 11 participants. The best
value of the parameter was relatively consistent between
cross-validation folds (Figure 3B, inset). Finally, the reverse se-
quenceness effect was stable across trials within each session
(Figure 3D). Examples of individual sequence events, each last-
ing on the order of 100–200 ms, are shown in Figure 4.
Length of Sequences
We next asked whether the reverse sequenceness effect was
driven by pairs of object representations appearing in isolated
sequences (i.e., length 2 sequences) or by longer contiguous se-
quences. We explored sequences of length 3, 4, and 5. A length
3 reverse sequence would occur if, for example, state S6 had
high probability at time t, state S5 had high probability at time
t + 40 ms, and state S4 had high probability at time t + 80 ms.
The length n sequenceness measure we used was a generaliza-
tion of the cross-correlation measure used to detect length 2
sequences (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for
details). Because this method does not allow direct comparison
of effect magnitude between different sequence lengths, we
compared effect reliability using the same multilevel model
described above. The fixed effect intercept term, which quan-
tifies overall sequenceness, was reliably different from zero at
40 ms state-to-state lag for length 3 (p = 0.009) and length 4
(p = 0.004) sequences. The intercept term was not different
from zero for length 5 sequences (p = 0.4). We conclude that
spontaneous state representations tended to occur as fast
sequences of up to four consecutive states (Figure 5).
Given that the sequence effect was strongest at a state-to-
state lag of 40 ms, we estimated that an entire 4-state sequence,
consisting of three transitions, lasted on the order of 120 ms. As
in most rodent studies (e.g., Diba and Buzsa´ki, 2007; Dragoi and
Tonegawa, 2011; Gupta et al., 2010; Ji and Wilson, 2007), these
sequences were compressed in time relative to real experience.
The most visually striking marker of state change during move
execution was the visual cross-fade between objects, which
took 350 ms. Relative to this, sequences were temporally com-
pressed by a factor of 9. Meanwhile, the duration of an entiremodels in cross-validation, with each panel corresponding to a different true
state and each colored line showing the output of a different model. Because
the models were trained only at 200 ms, correct prediction had a briefer peak
than in other studies where classifiers were both trained and tested at every
time point (e.g., Kurth-Nelson et al., 2015).
(B) Prediction accuracy could be estimated by treating the index of the model
with highest probability output as the predicted object. In cross-validation, the
prediction accuracy reached 53.7% ± 3.8%, where chance was 16.7%.
Dashed lines show 95% of empirical null distribution obtained by shuffling
state labels. Shading indicates SEM.
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Figure 3. Decoded State Representations follow Reverse Sequences through the Maze
(A) Probability time series output from the six regression models on a single example trial (one of 603 trials analyzed). Time zero corresponds to the start of the
planning phase of the trial. We were interested in whether these time series contained any sequences following the transition structure of the task.
(B) The y axis is the degree to which a neural representation of a state tended to be followed by (positive y) or preceded by (negative y) a neural representation of a
successive state in the task (cf. Figure 1A), a measure we call sequenceness. This was quantified independently at all possible state-to-state lags (x axis). There
was strong evidence for reverse sequenceness at around 40ms of state-to-state lag. This effect was significant by parametric mixed intercept model (p = 0.0015
at 40 ms, not corrected for multiple lags) and by a non-parametric test based on shuffling the state identities. Dotted line shows non-parametric p = 0.036
threshold independently at each lag. Dashed line shows the peak of shuffles over all lags, which corrects formultiple lags, andwas exceeded by the real data from
20 to 70 ms of lag. Inset: the lasso penalty for logistic regression models was selected by leave-one-out cross-validation over subjects to prevent over-fitting.
Histogram shows distribution of lasso penalties across subjects.
(C) 12/12 participants had reverse sequenceness at some time between 20 and 70 ms. Each line is an individual participant’s sequenceness plotted for all lags.
Each participant is shown in the same color as in Figure 1. Individual data are shown at the group mode lasso penalty, 0.006.
(D) The sequence effect was stable over trials within session (averaged over participants). Trials beyond 34 are not shown because few sessions exceeded
34 trials.state transition, including the time to display reward information,
varied from approximately 1 to 4 s. Relative to this benchmark,
sequences were temporally compressed by a factor of25–100.
Negative Results
Between participants, there was no significant relationship be-
tween planning time and earnings (p = 0.3 by regression on sub-
ject means), between planning time and sequenceness (p = 0.5
by regression on subject means), or between earnings and se-
quenceness (p = 0.2 by regression on subject means). We note
that the absence of evidence in inter-individual differences
should be interpreted cautiously, as the small sample size of
the study was ill-suited to detect such differences.
Finally, we asked whether we could detect any trial-by-trial
relationship between neural sequences and behavior. Across tri-
als, we regressed the magnitude of sequenceness against the
actual earnings and found no effect (p = 0.83 by linear mixed
effects). We also regressed the magnitude of sequenceness
against planning time on the same trial and found no effect
(p = 0.27 by linear mixed effects).
As a more specific test, we asked whether the specific se-
quences encoded in the MEG data on a trial were predictive of
the moves a subject would actually make on that trial. To test
this, we ran a similar analysis to the main sequence analysis,
but looking at the cross-correlation between individual pairs of
states at 40 ms lag. For each state pair, we again subtracted198 Neuron 91, 194–204, July 6, 2016reverse (Sj/Si) from forward (Si/Sj) cross-correlations. This
yielded a magnitude of ‘‘sequenceness’’ for each individual
pair (Figure S5). At the group level, there was no evidence for
differences between pairs (one-way ANOVA, F(11,132) = 0.92,
p = 0.52), as would be expected because themapping from state
to visual object was randomized between participants. We then
tested whether trial-by-trial variability in these individual pairs
related to behavior. On each trial, participants chose a sequence
of four moves, or four i/j tuples. We tested whether the magni-
tude of sequenceness for individual tuples in the MEG data was
greater for chosen tuples than unchosen tuples and found no ef-
fect (p = 0.85 by mixed intercept model). We also repeated the
same analysis but restricted to the first chosenmove in each trial;
again, there was no difference between neural sequenceness of
chosen tuples versus unchosen tuples (p = 0.15). Finally, we
evaluated whether themagnitude of sequenceness for individual
tuples in the MEG data was greater for chosen tuples than un-
chosen tuples on the previous trial and again found no effect
when analyzing all four moves (p = 0.62) or only the first chosen
move (p = 0.42).
DISCUSSION
We show that spontaneous MEG activity plays out fast se-
quences of state representations, after participants have learned
a non-spatial navigation task based on one-way connections
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Figure 4. Example Sequence Events
Time progresses rightward along the x axis. Each
row depicts the probability outputs of one
regression model, and the rows are sorted top to
bottom to follow the reverse order of transitions in
the task. Each example is from a different partici-
pant. Wemanually selected examples on the basis
of looking good, so they should not be taken as
statistically meaningful.between these states. These sequences formed trajectories of
up to four states that progressed backward through the connec-
tions of the task. The sequences had a state-to-state lag of
40 ms, meaning that a whole trajectory lasted on the order of
120 ms. Although spontaneous sequences have been reliably
observed in rodent spatial navigation experiments, this is the first
report, to our knowledge, of such sequences in humans, as well
as the first in a non-spatial task setting (although sequences in
spatial tasks can be modulated by information about non-spatial
context; Takahashi, 2015). These results suggest that fast non-
local sequences may be a fundamental neural mechanism in
decision making that is conserved across species and across
problem domains.
Non-spatial Sequences and Hippocampus
Although all previous observations of fast spontaneous se-
quences have used spatial tasks, most of the functions sug-
gested for these sequences in learning and decision making
apply to non-spatial as well as spatial settings. Accordingly, a
role for fast neural state sequences has been hypothesized in a
range of cognitive processes (Buzsa´ki and Moser, 2013; Carr
et al., 2011; Pezzulo et al., 2014).
Tolman made the seminal suggestion that an agent should
build abstract cognitive maps for non-spatial as well as spatial
tasks (Tolman, 1948). A computational view has emerged that
this is a role played by the hippocampus and associated brain
structures in a wide range of cognitive problems (Allen et al.,
2016; Collin et al., 2015; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2014; Killian
et al., 2012; Milivojevic and Doeller, 2013; Muller et al., 1996;
O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Redish, 1999; Schapiro et al., 2012;
Shapiro and Eichenbaum, 1999; Takahashi, 2013; Tavares
et al., 2015). If so, the hippocampus should express sequences
in non-spatial tasks as it does in spatial tasks.
However, although MEG contains signals of hippocampal
origin (Dalal et al., 2013), and several studies have reported
source localizing MEG activity to hippocampus (e.g., Cornwell
et al., 2008; Guitart-Masip et al., 2013), these signals are rela-
tively difficult to detect, rendering it unlikely that the sequences
we recorded arose directly from hippocampus. First, a fall-off
of magnetic field strength with the square of distance from neural
sources ensures cortical activity dominates the MEG signal (Ha¨-
ma¨la¨inen et al., 1993; Riggs et al., 2009; Stephen et al., 2005).Second, our classifiers were trained on
evoked visual responses shortly after
visual stimulus onset, which can be
assumed to reflect most strongly activity
arising in a cortical visual processingstream. Third, the sensors used by the regularized regression
models were mostly occipital and posterior temporal sensors
in a pattern different from that reported for putative hippocampal
activity (Dalal et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2013).
The fact that our classifiers were trained on visual evoked ac-
tivity makes it most likely that the observed sequences corre-
sponded to reactivation of visual representations. In humans,
the pattern of cortical activity observed during direct experience
with a sensory object is at least partially reinstated when the ob-
ject is retrieved or remembered (Danker and Anderson, 2010;
Kuhl and Chun, 2014; Nyberg et al., 2000; Polyn et al., 2005;
Wimmer and Shohamy, 2012). This reactivation is implicated in
model-based reasoning, and we have previously shown that it
can be tracked at fast timescales with MEG (Kurth-Nelson
et al., 2015).
Since hippocampus drives cortical representations during
retrieval (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2014), it is possible that sequences
generated in hippocampus (perhaps during sharp-wave ripples
[SWRs]) might drive sequences of cortical activity detected
by our classifiers. This would be consistent with a coupling
observed between hippocampus and cortex during SWRs (Sia-
pas andWilson, 1998; Sirota et al., 2003; Wierzynski et al., 2009)
and the coordination of hippocampal and cortical sequences
(Ji and Wilson, 2007). However, this remains speculative, and
our data provide no direct evidence of an upstream role for
hippocampus. It is entirely possible that the sequences we
observed originated from intrinsic cortical dynamics, in keeping
with prior observations that spontaneous space-related se-
quences occur in a variety of cortical areas in rats and primates
(Euston et al., 2007; Hoffman andMcNaughton, 2002; Ji andWil-
son, 2007).
Forward versus Reverse Sequences
Our main analysis was based on subtracting reverse from for-
ward sequenceness. At most latencies, there was no difference
between the two. However, at a lag of around 40 ms, there was
much stronger expression of reverse compared to forward se-
quenceness. In principle, this effect at 40 ms could reflect either
an increase in reverse sequences or a reduction in forward se-
quences, relative to baseline. However, we think the latter
unlikely because it would imply a consistent positive amount of
forward sequenceness at all other latencies.Neuron 91, 194–204, July 6, 2016 199
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Figure 5. Sequences Are Reliable up to Length 4, but Not Length 5
(A–C) The sequenceness measure shown in Figure 3B could be generalized
to longer sequences. These plots show the degree to which decoded
state representations appeared in consecutive sequences of length 3 (A), 4 (B),
or 5 (C).
(D) The un-normalized inner products used to detect higher-order sequences
did not bear direct comparison between different sequence length, but could
be compared through their reliabilities, expressed as p values of the mixed
intercept model described in the main text. Length 3 and length 4 sequences
were nearly as reliable as the length 2 sequences shown in Figure 3, but no
length 5 sequences were detectable at 40 ms lag. (A trend toward length 5
reverse sequenceness appeared at a slower state-to-state lag of 100 ms but
did not reach significance.) A dashed line is drawn at p = 0.05 for reference.Sequences within hippocampal SWRs in rats, which occur
when the animal is pausing or resting, have been observed in
both forward and reverse order (Diba and Buzsa´ki, 2007; Foster
and Wilson, 2006; Gupta et al., 2010; Na´dasdy et al., 1999;
Skaggs and McNaughton, 1996). Theta sequences, which occur
during active behavior, are nearly always forward (Foster and
Wilson, 2007; Gupta et al., 2012; Johnson and Redish, 2007; Wi-
kenheiser and Redish, 2013, 2015). This raises the question of
the behavioral state of our subjects during the planning period
of up to 60 s when sequences were observed. Given the rela-
tively long time permitted for planning (up to 60 s) in our task,
and the high attentional demands at other times within the
task, it is entirely plausible that sequence events seen in our
study corresponded to moments when people were pausing
from actively calculating moves.
Another interesting question concerns whether neural se-
quences are ‘‘local’’ or ‘‘remote,’’ meaning whether or not they
represent a trajectory that includes the current state of the agent.
In rodents, theta sequences contain (but do not necessarily
begin or end at) the current location of the animal (Gupta et al.,
2012; Johnson and Redish, 2007; Wikenheiser and Redish,
2015). By contrast, SWR sequences sometimes include the cur-200 Neuron 91, 194–204, July 6, 2016rent location of the animal (Diba and Buzsa´ki, 2007; Foster and
Wilson, 2006) but also encode trajectories that do not include
the current location of the animal (Davidson et al., 2009; Gupta
et al., 2010; Karlsson and Frank, 2009). In our MEG data, se-
quences containing the state pair of the participant’s first move
on the trial were no more common than sequences not contain-
ing this pair, suggesting that sequences were as likely to be initi-
ated remotely as locally.
Length of Sequences
Hippocampal sequence events in rodents last on the order of 50–
200 ms, whether they occur in theta (Wikenheiser and Redish,
2015) or in SWRs (Diba and Buzsa´ki, 2007). This is similar to
the 120 ms length we estimate for a four-state sequence event
in our data. In rodent navigation experiments, states are defined
continuously in space rather than discretely as in our maze,
which does not admit a direct comparison with the number of
states visited.
Retrospection versus Prospection
In the rodent literature, a number of functions are imputed in
common to both forward and reverse sequences. This is partic-
ularly true of retrospective functions including assigning credit to
recent experience (Foster and Wilson, 2006), consolidating
memory (Carr et al., 2011), or active memory maintenance (Ka´li
and Dayan, 2004). Consistent with a role in learning andmemory,
new experiences boost the frequency of SWRs (Eschenko et al.,
2008) and boost coordination of neuronal activity within these
SWRs (Cheng and Frank, 2008), while disruption of SWRs harms
memory performance (Girardeau et al., 2009; Jadhav et al.,
2012). The complexity of our task raises the possibility that
consolidating knowledge of task structure was ongoing during
performance, and the sequences we observed in MEG might
play a role in this process.
Sequences ascribed prospective functions have most often
been of a forward variety (Johnson and Redish, 2007; van der
Meer and Redish, 2009; van der Meer et al., 2010; Pfeiffer and
Foster, 2013; Wikenheiser and Redish, 2015). The reverse order
of our sequences, along with the fact that they were not more
likely than chance to contain the subsequently chosen state
sequence, might argue against a prospective function. However,
reverse sequences with a possibly prospective function were
observed in O´lafsdo´ttir et al. (2015), and some rodent studies
postulating a prospective function for sequences observed no
simple relationship between neural sequences and upcoming
behavior (e.g., Johnson and Redish, 2007). It is perfectly
possible to plan backward instead of forward (e.g., LaValle,
2006), and it would be premature to conclude that the sequences
we observed have purely retrospective functions. One inter-
esting future test would be to collect MEG data during times
when participants do not have access to information they need
to plan an upcoming action. If sequences are in fact used for on-
line planning, we would expect they should not occur when par-
ticipants are not actively engaged in planning.
Intermediate between retrospective and prospective ac-
counts, the observed sequences might also play a role in
working memory. Even after training, participants reported that
recalling the transitions was effortful. Fast neural sequences
could reflect a form of online working memory, interfacing be-
tween long-term memory and planning mechanisms. Another
possible intermediate function is offline planning (Shohamy
and Daw, 2015; Sutton, 1991), where values of paths or
sub-paths might be calculated and stored in anticipation of
future use.
Conclusions
Our results highlight the power of multivariate analysis of MEG
data to trace the trajectories of fast-evolving neural representa-
tions in humans. In addition to being non-invasive, multivariate
MEG has an added benefit of tracking representations that
may be distributed across wide cortical areas. Applying this
methodology has enabled us to provide the first evidence for
fast spontaneous sequences of state representations in the hu-
man brain. Additionally the findings demonstrate this neural
motif outside the spatial domain. Thus, fast sequences appear
to be a fundamental principle of neural computation in a range
of cognitive domains.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
12 adults aged 18–31 participated in the experiment, recruited from the UCL
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience subject pool and from a mailing list for
MSc students. Six were female and two were left-handed. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no history of psychiatric
or neurological disorders. Eight of the 12 participants underwent two scanning
sessions, for a total of 20 recorded sessions. Two of these sessions were
excluded before the start of analysis owing to large artifacts, leaving 18
analyzed sessions. All participants provided written informed consent and
consent to publish prior to start of the experiment, which was approved by
the Research Ethics Committee at University College London (UK), under
ethics number 1825/005.
Task
In the MEG scanner, participants performed a 6-state sequential reasoning
task inspired by Huys et al. (2012, 2015) but designed with the additional cri-
terion of encouragingmental representation of the visual objects that identified
each state. The task was implemented in MATLAB (MathWorks) using Cogent
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London). Each
trial began with the participant being placed at a randomly selected state
within the maze. From this state, they were permitted four sequential moves
with the instructed aim of maximizing their earnings. From each state, a
move constituted one of two possible choices, called ‘‘up’’ and ‘‘down’’ (so-
called for simplicity of button pressing, although there was no meaningful
spatial relationship between the states). Each of these choices deterministi-
cally led to a different next state. Only one state was ever viewed at a time,
and participants never saw a bird’s-eye view of the maze.
Each state provided a monetary outcome of between5 and +5 pence. The
reward for each state drifted independently at randomby1, 0, or +1 pence on
each trial. Upon reaching a state, the state’s current reward value was added
to the participant’s running total for that trial. This running total was also dis-
played on the screen while moves were being executed. Finally, in each trial,
two randomly selected states were designated as ‘‘neg’’ states. When a neg
state was reached, first its reward value was added to the running total for
the trial as usual, but then the sign of the running total for the trial was flipped
(e.g., 9 became +9 and vice versa). The identities of the neg states were
signaled in text at the beginning of each trial. In many trials, the optimal strat-
egy involved the use of one or two neg states. Two neg states could be used
within a trial to reach a positive total reward, or a single neg state could be used
in conjunction with negative state reward.
On each trial, participants were first shown in text the names of the starting
state and the two neg states and allowed up to 60 s to plan. After the end of theplanning period, participants were faced with a blank screen upon which they
could pre-enter their chosen sequence of four moves. They were allowed up to
3 s to enter the first move and 1 s for each of the last three moves. As they pre-
entered each move, a corresponding up or down arrow appeared on the
screen for confirmation, but no visual objects were shown. After pre-entering
all four moves, the visual object corresponding to the starting state of this trial
appeared. Participants were then required to repeat the sequence of moves
they had pre-entered. As they executed each move, the visual object shown
on the screen changed to reflect the corresponding state transition. Up to
10 s was permitted to execute eachmove. Executing each move was followed
by 350 ms of animated cross-fade transition between visual objects, followed
by 500 ms pause, followed by the current reward amount of the new state
displayed for 1,000 ms, followed by the total trial earnings being updated
and displayed for 1,000 ms, followed by a neg and corresponding change to
total trial earnings, if any, being displayed for 1,000 ms. If this was the final
move of the trial, the final reward for the trial was then displayed for
3,000 ms; otherwise, the next move could be entered.
The task design was motivated by a wish to encourage participants to learn
and use the transition structure of the task, instead of relying on simple choice
strategies like repeating reinforced actions. We reasoned that engaging partic-
ipants with the transition structure would afford us the best chance of detect-
ing neural sequences reflecting this structure. Two other features of the task
design were also intended to meet this purpose. First, trials were generated
such that simple choice strategies would yield much lower payouts than
optimal planning strategies (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for
more detail). Second, pre-entry of the four sequential moves on each trial
was made in the absence of feedback about the consequences of those
moves until all four had been entered. This meant that participants had to
anticipate where move m would lead in order to make a good decision on
move m + 1.
Each of the six states in the maze was a unique visual object. For each
participant, the six objects were drawn randomly from a set of ten objects
(bird, bread, cat, chair, garlic, hammer, hand, horn, tree, water), and the six
chosen objects were randomly assigned to the six states of the maze.
After the 6-state reasoning task, participants completed a secondary task
while still in the scanner. This task was designed to elicit neural representations
of known stimuli, which could be used to train classificationmodels. In this sec-
ondary task, the name of a visual object appeared in text for a variable duration
of 1,500 to 3,000ms, followed immediately by the visual object itself. On20%of
trials, the object was upside-down. Tomaintain attention, participants were in-
structed to press one button if the object was correct-side-up, and a different
button if it was upside-down. Once the participant pressed a button, the object
was replaced with a green fixation cross if the response was correct and a red
cross if the responsewas incorrect. Thiswas followedby a variable length inter-
trial interval of 700 to 1,700ms. Each session included 125 trials of the second-
ary task, with approximately 16 correct side-up presentations of each visual
object. Only correct-side-up presentations were used for classifier training.
The trial order was randomized for each participant. Per participant, the visual
objects used were the same six objects used in the main task.
Behavior Analysis
We fit four models to explain participants’ choices. ‘‘Plan’’ used a full-depth
tree search to calculate the value of each of the 16 possible sequences of
four moves on each trial. This model represented optimal behavior on the
task. ‘‘Qfirst’’ used no knowledge of the task’s structure but learned Q-values
for the 12 available state-action pairs based only on the first move in each trial.
‘‘Qall’’ also learned Q-values for the 12 available state-action pairs but ex-
ploited knowledge of the task structure to evaluate actions and update
Q-values for all four moves in each trial. ‘‘Greedy’’ also used knowledge of
the task structure but, rather than learning Q-values, selected each move in
sequence by maximizing expected return locally from that move. Details of
models and model comparison are given in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
MEG Acquisition and Pre-processing
MEG was recorded continuously at 600 samples/second using a whole-head
275-channel axial gradiometer system (CTF Omega, VSM MedTech), whileNeuron 91, 194–204, July 6, 2016 201
participants sat upright inside the scanner. Participants made responses on
three buttons (called ‘‘up,’’ ‘‘down,’’ and ‘‘advance’’) of a button box using
the fingers they found most comfortable.
The data were resampled from 600 Hz to 100 Hz to conserve processing
time and improve signal to noise ratio. Thus, data samples used for analysis
were spaced every 10 ms. All data were then high-pass filtered at 0.5 Hz using
a first-order IIR filter to remove slow drift. All analyses were performed directly
on the filtered, cleaned MEG signal, consisting of a length 134 vector of sam-
ples every 10 ms, in units of femtotesla.
Multivariate MEG Analysis
Lasso-regularized logistic regression models were trained on MEG data eli-
cited by direct presentations of the visual objects. These presentations were
taken from the secondary task that succeeded the 6-state reasoning task in
the scanner, specifically the data 200 ms following stimulus onset. This
200 ms time point was selected based on observations from our previous
work (Kurth-Nelson et al., 2015), which showed that when object representa-
tions are retrieved, the reinstated spatial pattern used in value reasoning is
most similar to the pattern observed 200 ms after onset of direct object pre-
sentation. This constitutes the only available information to our knowledge
about which of the time series of patterns evoked by direct object experience
might be reinstated during decision making.
Models were verified on training data through cross-validation. In each
cross-validation fold, we partitioned the data randomly, under constraints
that ensured balanced classes for training: (1) each object had at least one
left-out trial, (2) each object had the same number of left-in trials, and (3) the
number of left-out trials wasminimized subject to the other two constraints be-
ing satisfied.
A trained model k consisted of a single vector bk with length 135: slope co-
efficients for each of the 134 sensors together with an intercept coefficient. We
used these trained models to make predictions as to whether unlabeled MEG
data corresponded to a neural representation of visual object k. Each time
point was treated independently. At each time point in the unlabeled data,
the data vector over sensors was multiplied by bk and transformed by a sig-
moid to obtain a predicted probability for visual object k. This procedure
yielded six probabilities at each time point; so for each trial we obtained a
matrix X with six columns and as many rows as time bins in the trial.
Sequenceness Measure
Inspired by cross-correlation measures used in the analysis of spike data from
rodent hippocampus (e.g., Hoffman and McNaughton, 2002), we used the
matrix X to calculate a ‘‘sequenceness’’ measure. Sequenceness operational-
ized the degree to which decoded MEG activity tended to follow the transition
matrix of the task systematically in either a forward or reverse direction. For
example, in the task, state S1 admitted a transition to state S2 (but not S3,
S4, or S6; cf. Figure 1A). If X contained forward sequences, then the decoded
probability of S1 at time T should be correlated with the decoded probability of
S2 at time T + t, where t defines a lag between neural state representations.
Meanwhile, reverse sequences would be expected to support the opposite
decoding order.
The sequencenessmeasurewas calculated independently for each possible
lag t. We first multiplied X by the transition matrix of the task (assuming equal
probabilities for the two possible actions from each state) to obtain XF and
then calculated the cross-correlation at varying time-lags between column i
of X and column i of XF. This produced six correlations for each possible
time-lag. These six correlations were averaged to obtain a single number rep-
resenting the overall forward sequenceness at that time-lag. In parallel, we also
multiplied X by the reverse transition matrix of the task to obtain XR and again
calculated the cross-correlation at varying time-lags between X and XR. This
yielded the reverse sequenceness at each time-lag. We finally subtracted the
reverse sequenceness from the forward sequenceness at each time-lag.
As a parametric test for the difference of sequence effect from zero, we esti-
mated a mixed model with only intercept (and no slope) terms.
yi = b+bk + errori ;
where yi was the sequenceness on trial i, b was the fixed effect intercept, k
was the participant on trial i, and bkwas the random effect intercept for partic-202 Neuron 91, 194–204, July 6, 2016ipant k. bkwere assumed to be normally distributed with variance s. Themodel
was estimated using Matlab’s fitlme function.
We also protected the statistical inference using non-parametric permuta-
tion tests involving all possible ways of scrambling the six state labels. There
were 30 unique permutations of the state labels up to symmetries in the tran-
sition matrix of the task. One of these was the identity permutation and one
was the reverse-order permutation. For non-parametric significance testing,
we therefore used the peak of the absolute value of the other 28 unique
permutations as a threshold, at an approximate empirical two-tailed p value
of 1/28z 0.036.
Although sample order is sometimes shuffled in rodent electrophysiology
experiments, we found in simulations that the substantial autocorrelation in
the MEG time series meant that shuffling sample order led to very high false
positive rates (Figure S4). Shuffling state identity is a more conservative mea-
sure, which allowed us to reject the null hypothesis that the MEG time series
had no relationship to the transition structure of the task.
Importantly, the statistical tests protect against the possibility of systematic
dynamics in brain activity (for example, anterior to posterior sweeps of activity)
leading to false detection of sequences. Any such activity not reflecting the
transition structure of the task would, by definition, be unbiased in whether it
appeared to progress forward or backward through the task transitions.
Up to 60 s ofMEG data per trial were analyzed for sequenceness, potentially
raising a question of whether false positives could arise through the sheer
amount of data analyzed. However, this can be ruled out. The cross-correla-
tion analysis does not report the total number of sequences, but the density
of sequences per time, meaning that analyzing a longer period of MEG data
would not inflate the sequenceness measure. Also, the permutation test
used scales to the amount of data, since each permutation is calculated on
the full data.
Testing for Length-n Sequences
We also computed the extent to which neural sequences followed multiple
consecutive steps with the same state-to-state lag, using a similar procedure
as described above. Multiplying X by the task’s transition matrix twice, we ob-
tained XFF. We then element-wise multiplied column i of X, column i of XF
shifted by lag t, and column i of XFF shifted by lag 2t and summed the product.
For each lag t, this yielded six numbers akin to cross-correlations except for
being un-normalized. These six numbers were averaged to obtain a single
number representing the overall propensity for two forward steps to occur
consecutively (which we call ‘‘length 3’’ sequences because they consist of
three states). An analogous procedure applied to reverse transitions. This pro-
cess could be generalized to any number of steps. This method explicitly asks
whether all states in a length-n sequence occur and is not sensitive to se-
quences that skip intermediate states.
All summary statistics are given as mean ± SE, unless otherwise stated.
Median and IQR are given when the underlying distribution is substantially
non-Gaussian.
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